Using Perilog to Explore "Decision Making at NASA" by McGreevy, Michael W.
NASA/TM–2005-213469
Using Perilog to Explore “Decision Making at NASA”
Michael W. McGreevy
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
October 2005
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060018421 2019-08-29T21:46:11+00:00Z
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the
advancement of aeronautics and space science. The
NASA Scientific and Technical Information (STI)
Program Office plays a key part in helping NASA
maintain this important role.
The NASA STI Program Office is operated by
Langley Research Center, the Lead Center for
NASA’s scientific and technical information. The
NASA STI Program Office provides access to the
NASA STI Database, the largest collection of
aeronautical and space science STI in the world.
The Program Office is also NASA’s institutional
mechanism for disseminating the results of its
research and development activities. These results
are published by NASA in the NASA STI Report
Series, which includes the following report types:
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of
completed research or a major significant phase
of research that present the results of NASA
programs and include extensive data or theoreti-
cal analysis. Includes compilations of significant
scientific and technical data and information
deemed to be of continuing reference value.
NASA’s counterpart of peer-reviewed formal
professional papers but has less stringent
limitations on manuscript length and extent
of graphic presentations.
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific and
technical findings that are preliminary or of
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports,
working papers, and bibliographies that contain
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive
analysis.
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and
technical findings by NASA-sponsored
contractors and grantees.
The NASA STI Program Office . . . in Profile
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected
papers from scientific and technical confer-
ences, symposia, seminars, or other meetings
sponsored or cosponsored by NASA.
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, technical,
or historical information from NASA programs,
projects, and missions, often concerned with
subjects having substantial public interest.
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific and
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission.
Specialized services that complement the STI
Program Office’s diverse offerings include creating
custom thesauri, building customized databases,
organizing and publishing research results . . . even
providing videos.
For more information about the NASA STI
Program Office, see the following:
• Access the NASA STI Program Home Page at
http://www.sti.nasa.gov
• E-mail your question via the Internet to
help@sti.nasa.gov
• Fax your question to the NASA Access Help
Desk at (301) 621-0134
• Telephone the NASA Access Help Desk at
(301) 621-0390
• Write to:
NASA Access Help Desk
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information
7121 Standard Drive
Hanover, MD 21076-1320
NASA/TM–2005-213469
Using Perilog to Explore “Decision Making at NASA”
Michael W. McGreevy
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
October 2005
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 94035-1000
Available from:
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information National Technical Information Service
7121 Standard Drive 5285 Port Royal Road
Hanover, MD 21076-1320 Springfield, VA 22161
(301) 621-0390 (703) 487-4650
Table of Contents 
 
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................................. 1 
APPLYING PERILOG ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 
FROM FLIGHT TO A PIVOTAL DECISION............................................................................................................... 2 
VOCABULARY REVIEW...................................................................................................................................................... 2 
KEYWORD-IN-CONTEXT SEARCH ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
PHRASE REVIEW................................................................................................................................................................ 4 
PHRASE SEARCH ............................................................................................................................................................... 4 
SUMMARY OF THIS EXAMPLE ............................................................................................................................................ 5 
FROM FOAM TO IN-FLIGHT ANOMALY 1983-2003 ............................................................................................... 5 
VOCABULARY REVIEW...................................................................................................................................................... 5 
PHRASE GENERATION........................................................................................................................................................ 5 
PHRASE SEARCH ............................................................................................................................................................... 5 
ABOUT PHRASE MATCHING ............................................................................................................................................... 6 
SEARCH BY EXAMPLE (1 OF 2) .......................................................................................................................................... 6 
SEARCH BY EXAMPLE (2 OF 2) .......................................................................................................................................... 7 
SUMMARY OF THIS EXAMPLE ............................................................................................................................................ 7 
CONDITIONS AND CONTINGENCIES: IF P THEN Q ............................................................................................. 7 
EXAMPLE OF IF P THEN Q................................................................................................................................................... 8 
ANALYSIS OF THE ASSERTION ........................................................................................................................................... 9 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF THE ASSERTION........................................................................................................ 11 
SUMMARY REGARDING "IF-THEN" ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................. 12 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................................ 12 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................................. 12 
APPENDIX 1. PROCESSING THE CAIB TEXT FOR INPUT TO PERILOG ....................................................... 14 
OBTAINING THE PDF FILE AND CONVERTING IT TO TEXT................................................................................................ 14 
EDITING PROBLEMATIC OUTPUT...................................................................................................................................... 14 
CHARACTER PROCESSING ............................................................................................................................................... 16 
EDITING TEXT TO CREATE UNITS OF TEXT BASED ON PARAGRAPHS................................................................................. 16 
LABELING UNITS OF TEXT ............................................................................................................................................... 17 
SELECTING A STOPLIST ................................................................................................................................................... 18 
APPENDIX 2. EXAMPLES OF PASSAGES ABOUT BELIEF. ................................................................................ 20 
APPENDIX 3. EXCERPTS CONTAINING THE WORD "IF", SORTED ON SOURCE PARAGRAPHS.......... 21 
APPENDIX 4. EXCERPTS CONTAINING THE WORD "IF", SORTED ON EXCERPTS.................................. 22 
 
 iii
List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 1. USING PERILOG TOOLS IN CONCERT, SHOWING TYPICAL SEQUENCES OF TOOL USE... 2 
FIGURE 2. ANALYSIS OF THE ASSERTION: "IF IT [I.E.,  FOAM] HIT THE RCC, [THEN] WE DON'T SEE ANY 
[SAFETY-OF-FLIGHT] ISSUE"  .......................................................................................................................................... 10 
 
 
iv 
Using Perilog to Explore Decision Making at NASA  
MICHAEL W. MCGREEVY 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Summary 
Perilog, a context intensive text mining system, is used as 
a discovery tool to explore topics and concerns in 
"Decision Making at NASA, chapter 6 of the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report Volume 1. 
Two examples illustrate how Perilog can be used to 
discover highly significant safety-related information in 
the text without prior knowledge of the contents of the 
document. A third example illustrates how "if-then" 
statements found by Perilog can be used in logical 
analysis of decision making. In addition, in order to serve 
as a guide for future work, the technical details of 
preparing a PDF document for input to Perilog are 
included in an appendix. 
Introduction 
On February 1, 2003, Space Shuttle Columbia on 
STS-107 disintegrated during re-entry, killing its crew of 
seven astronauts, grounding the Space Shuttle, calling 
into question NASA's decision making and organizational 
culture, and testing the commitment of the United States 
to human space flight. 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board released its 
final report on the causes of the accident on August 26, 
2003, citing both physical and organizational causes. 
According to the report, decision making during the 
mission was a central factor among the causes of the 
accident. The CAIB concluded that "Management 
decisions made during Columbia's final flight reflect 
missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective 
communications channels, flawed analysis, and 
ineffective leadership." (CAIB 2003: 170).  
Upon reading the CAIB report, it becomes clear that it is 
a very rich repository of highly detailed information of 
fundamental importance to safety at NASA. In order to 
maximize the benefit of this and similar documents, it can 
be helpful to apply text mining methods to them, so that 
essential details and patterns among them are readily 
accessible. For example, NASA's Perilog text mining 
methods and software have been shown to be very helpful 
in exploring large collections of aviation incident reports 
and finding incident reports relevant to accident reports 
(e.g., McGreevy 2001; McGreevy and Statler 1998). As 
an illustration of Perilog's utility as a discovery tool and 
an aid to analysis of decision making, it has been applied 
here to a chapter of the CAIB report. 
The CAIB report is available as electronic text in Portable 
Document Format (PDF). Given the limitations of 
converting complex PDF files to text, and the desire to 
reliably label paragraphs with page numbers, the text 
preparation is somewhat demanding. Consequently, a 
single chapter of the CAIB report, "Decision Making at 
NASA" (chapter 6), was selected to serve as a test case. 
The details of the text preparation are described in 
appendix 1. 
After an introduction to Perilog, the emphasis of this 
paper is on using Perilog to explore "Decision Making at 
NASA. The first two examples illustrate how Perilog can 
be used to find highly significant safety-related 
information in the text, even without prior knowledge of 
the contents of the document. The third example shows 
how searching for the word "if" in the context of words 
importantly related to it, and investigating statements of 
the form "if p then q, can be of benefit to a logical 
analysis of decision making. 
Applying Perilog 
Perilog is a collection of patented text mining methods 
(McGreevy 2004a-d, McGreevy 2001) that have been 
created and implemented in software by the author. The 
methods are based on context intensive analysis, 
modeling, and relevance ranking of text to exploit latent 
linguistic structure in seemingly unstructured text 
(McGreevy 2005). The methods include keyword-in-
context search, flexible phrase search, phrase generation, 
phrase discovery, and search by example. They are 
supplemented by phrase review and vocabulary review. 
A collection of these text mining tools has been integrated 
by the author into a user-friendly Perilog software 
package that runs on Unix and has a browser-based 
graphical user interface for accessibility from any 
computer platform.  This package has been in operational 
use at the NASA/FAA Aviation Safety Reporting System 
and at a major airline since early 2002. A second major 
airline began to use Perilog in late 2004. A Perilog server 
has been used via network by a dozen researchers at 
NASA Ames Research Center since early 2003. Perilog 
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methods and software have also been distributed under 
government agreements and licenses to private 
companies, universities, and federal laboratories since 
mid-2001. 
Perilog has been extensively applied to aviation safety 
incident narratives (McGreevy 2001, McGreevy 1997, 
McGreevy 1996) and to accident reports (McGreevy & 
Statler 1998). Other applications of Perilog have involved 
text as diverse as industrial safety incident reports, 
financial disclosures, political speeches, and Space 
Shuttle maintenance reports. 
Application of Perilog to chapter 6 of the CAIB report is a 
departure from more typical applications to large 
collections of incident narratives in plain text format. The 
CAIB report is topically and graphically complex, with 
the main text augmented by many illustrations, captions, 
sidebars, email excerpts, viewgraphs, and the like. 
Consequently, converting it from PDF to coherent plain 
text for input to Perilog is not straightforward. Further, it 
is necessary to make decisions about what constitutes a 
unit of text within a large document and how best to label 
these units, and then to implement these decisions. In 
addition, preparation of any text for input to Perilog 
requires careful consideration of so-called "stopwords. 
Given this complexity, a single chapter of the report, 
"Decision Making at NASA" (chapter 6), was selected 
and processed in order to develop and document a method 
of preparing the text for input to Perilog. That method is 
documented in appendix 1. Not only does the method 
apply to the CAIB report, it also applies to many other 
PDF documents, especially large and complex ones. 
Perilog's processing of text is extensively documented in 
McGreevy (2001), so that is not discussed here. Further, 
Perilog's graphical user interface is thoroughly 
documented in McGreevy (2003), and that document is 
provided to all users of the Perilog system, so those 
details are not addressed here, either. Instead, the 
emphasis of this paper is on illustrating the use of Perilog 
for knowledge discovery. 
The first two examples illustrate the synergy of the 
Perilog tools and their use in discovering information 
about the contents of a database, in this case, one 
containing the paragraphs of a chapter of the CAIB 
report. Figure 1 suggests some typical sequences of 
Perilog tool use, several of which are illustrated in these 
examples. 
From flight to a pivotal decision 
This example shows how Perilog can be used to quickly 
obtain the answers to these questions: 
- What topics are prominent in the document? 
 
Figure 1. Using Perilog tools in concert, showing 
typical sequences of tool use, several of which 
are illustrated in the text. 
- What are the most relevant sections of the document 
regarding a particular topic? 
- What concerns are associated with this topic? 
- What are the most relevant sections of the document 
regarding particular concerns? 
Vocabulary review 
When searching a database of text, it is essential to be 
familiar with its vocabulary. The Perilog vocabulary 
review tool provides that familiarity. It can be used to list 
the words that are most commonly found in the database, 
or words containing particular patterns of letters. The 
output of vocabulary review does not include so-called 
stopwords (such as "the", "and", "an"). 
Shown below are the most prominent 26 words (in one 
case, a word fragment) in the CAIB chapter on "Decision 
Making at NASA, and their frequencies of occurrence.  
313 FLIGHT 142 MANAGEMENT 
310 FOAM 128 MANAGERS 
291 DEBRIS 128 ORBITER 
264 MISSION 116 BIPOD 
248 NOT 116 LAUNCH 
239 NASA 115 NO 
217 'S 108 STRIKE 
212 TEAM 107 COLUMBIA 
192 SHUTTLE 107 LOSS 
191 SPACE 104 ANALYSIS 
174 DAMAGE 102 SAFETY 
165 PROGRAM 101 EXTERNAL 
143 WOULD 101 TANK 
This list of vocabulary words provides a sense of the main 
topics in the chapter and their relative prominence. Note 
that "flight" is the most prominent word, followed by 
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"foam", "debris", and "mission". The list also includes 
words like "not", "would", and "no" since they are often 
found in narratives involving problematic situations. The 
listed item "'S" (apostrophe S) is a word fragment that 
typically indicates possession. (Note that Perilog currently 
processes all text as upper case.) 
Keyword-in-context search 
Using the most frequently occurring word, "flight", as a 
query to Perilog's keyword-in-context search, 156 
relevant paragraphs are found and presented in order of 
their relevance to "flight" in context, that is, "flight" in the 
context of words importantly related to it. Here is the 
most relevant paragraph (having capitalization and extra 
spacing introduced by Perilog) with instances of the word 
"flight" highlighted: 
THE THIRD BIPOD FOAM LOSS OCCURRED ON JUNE 25 
, 1992 , DURING THE LAUNCH OF COLUMBIA ON STS-50 
, WHEN AN APPROXIMATELY 26 - BY 10-INCH PIECE 
SEPARATED FROM THE LEFT BIPOD RAMP AREA . 
POST - MISSION INSPECTION REVEALED A 9-INCH BY 
4.5-INCH BY 0.5-INCH DIVOT IN THE TILE , THE 
LARGEST AREA OF TILE DAMAGE IN SHUTTLE 
HISTORY . THE EXTERNAL TANK PROJECT AT 
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER AND THE 
INTEGRATION OFFICE AT JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
CITED SEPARATE IN - FLIGHT ANOMALIES . THE 
INTEGRATION OFFICE CLOSED OUT ITS IN - FLIGHT 
ANOMALY TWO DAYS BEFORE THE NEXT FLIGHT , 
STS-46 , BY DEEMING DAMAGE TO THE THERMAL 
PROTECTION SYSTEM AN " ACCEPTED FLIGHT RISK . 
" 12 IN INTEGRATION HAZARD REPORT 37 , THE 
INTEGRATION OFFICE NOTED THAT THE IMPACT 
DAMAGE WAS SHALLOW , THE TILE LOSS WAS NOT A 
RESULT OF EXCESSIVE AERODYNAMIC LOADS , AND 
THE EXTERNAL TANK THERMAL PROTECTION 
SYSTEM FAILURE WAS THE RESULT OF " 
INADEQUATE VENTING . " 13 THE EXTERNAL TANK 
PROJECT CLOSED OUT ITS IN - FLIGHT ANOMALY 
WITH THE RATIONALE THAT FOAM LOSS DURING 
ASCENT WAS " NOT CONSIDERED A FLIGHT OR 
SAFETY ISSUE . " 14 NOTE THE DIFFERENCE IN HOW 
EACH PROGRAM ADDRESSED THE FOAM - SHEDDING 
PROBLEM : WHILE THE INTEGRATION OFFICE 
DEEMED IT AN " ACCEPTED RISK , " THE EXTERNAL 
TANK PROJECT CONSIDERED IT " NOT A SAFETY - OF - 
FLIGHT ISSUE . " HAZARD REPORT 37 WOULD FIGURE 
IN THE STS-113 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW , WHERE 
THE CRUCIAL DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE 
FLYING WITH THE FOAM - LOSS PROBLEM . THIS 
INCONSISTENCY WOULD REAPPEAR 10 YEARS LATER 
, AFTER BIPOD FOAM - SHEDDING DURING STS-112 . 
(CAIB 2003: 124) 
The above paragraph, which is highly relevant to "flight", 
repeatedly refers to foam loss and foam shedding in the 
context of flight: as separate In-Flight Anomalies cited by 
the External Tank Project at Marshall Space Flight Center 
and by the Integration Office at JSC; as an anomaly that 
was closed prior to the next flight (STS-46); as an 
accepted flight risk; as a closed out in-flight anomaly that 
was "not considered a flight or safety issue" and "not a 
safety-of-flight issue; and as the subject of a report that 
"would figure in the STS-113 Flight Readiness Review. 
This "flight" paragraph immediately suggests that "foam" 
is a significant concern. The prominence of "foam" in the 
vocabulary list shown earlier strongly supports this 
suggestion. By using "foam" as a new query to Perilog's 
keyword-in-contest search, the 121 relevant paragraphs 
are easily found and sorted on relevance. For example, 
here is the most relevant paragraph (grouped with its 
immediately preceding section header, as explained in 
appendix 1), with instances of the word "foam" 
highlighted: 
BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS EVENTS - CHUNKS OF FOAM 
FROM THE EXTERNAL TANK ' S FORWARD BIPOD 
ATTACHMENT , WHICH CONNECTS THE ORBITER TO 
THE EXTERNAL TANK , ARE SOME OF THE LARGEST 
PIECES OF DEBRIS THAT HAVE STRUCK THE ORBITER 
. TO PLACE THE FOAM LOSS FROM STS-107 IN A 
BROADER CONTEXT , THE BOARD EXAMINED EVERY 
KNOWN INSTANCE OF FOAM - SHEDDING FROM THIS 
AREA . FOAM LOSS FROM THE LEFT BIPOD RAMP ( 
CALLED THE - Y RAMP IN NASA PARLANCE ) HAS 
BEEN CONFIRMED BY IMAGERY ON 7 OF THE 113 
MISSIONS FLOWN . HOWEVER , ONLY ON 72 OF THESE 
MISSIONS WAS AVAILABLE IMAGERY OF SUFFICIENT 
QUALITY TO DETERMINE LEFT BIPOD RAMP FOAM 
LOSS . THEREFORE , FOAM LOSS FROM THE LEFT 
BIPOD AREA OCCURRED ON APPROXIMATELY 10 
PERCENT OF FLIGHTS ( SEVEN EVENTS OUT OF 72 
IMAGED FLIGHTS ) . ON THE 66 FLIGHTS THAT 
IMAGERY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE RIGHT BIPOD 
AREA , FOAM LOSS WAS NEVER OBSERVED . NASA 
COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY ONLY THE LEFT BIPOD 
EXPERIENCED FOAM LOSS . ( SEE FIGURE 6 . 1-1) (CAIB 
2003:123) 
The above paragraph is interpreted by Perilog as being 
highly relevant because the word "foam" is strongly 
contextually associated with words like "loss", "bipod", 
"ramp", "left", "shedding", "area", "external", "events", 
"tank", "STS-107", "chunks", "observed", etc. These 
contextual associations are situationally important in the 
CAIB chapter on "Decision Making at NASA, and are 
automatically made part of the query network used by 
Perilog when the user searches on the word "foam". That 
is why this search method is called keyword-in-context 
search. It does not merely find the keyword in the text, 
but finds the keyword in the contexts of situationally 
important words. Further, the user can enter multiple 
keywords, if desired. 
Perilog's keyword-in-context provides the option to 
highlight just the query terms in relevant text, as above, or 
to highlight the query terms and their contextually 
associated terms. Here is the same paragraph as above, 
but this time with "foam" and its contextually associated 
terms highlighted.  
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BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS EVENTS - CHUNKS OF 
FOAM FROM THE EXTERNAL TANK 'S FORWARD 
BIPOD ATTACHMENT , WHICH CONNECTS THE 
ORBITER TO THE EXTERNAL TANK , ARE SOME OF 
THE LARGEST PIECES OF DEBRIS THAT HAVE STRUCK 
THE ORBITER . TO PLACE THE FOAM LOSS FROM STS-
107 IN A BROADER CONTEXT , THE BOARD 
EXAMINED EVERY KNOWN INSTANCE OF FOAM - 
SHEDDING FROM THIS AREA . FOAM LOSS FROM THE 
LEFT BIPOD RAMP ( CALLED THE - Y RAMP IN NASA 
PARLANCE ) HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY IMAGERY ON 
7 OF THE 113 MISSIONS FLOWN . HOWEVER , ONLY ON 
72 OF THESE MISSIONS WAS AVAILABLE IMAGERY OF 
SUFFICIENT QUALITY TO DETERMINE LEFT BIPOD 
RAMP FOAM LOSS . THEREFORE , FOAM LOSS FROM 
THE LEFT BIPOD AREA OCCURRED ON 
APPROXIMATELY 10 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS ( SEVEN 
EVENTS OUT OF 72 IMAGED FLIGHTS ) . ON THE 66 
FLIGHTS THAT IMAGERY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE 
RIGHT BIPOD AREA , FOAM LOSS WAS NEVER 
OBSERVED . NASA COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY ONLY 
THE LEFT BIPOD EXPERIENCED FOAM LOSS . ( SEE 
FIGURE 6.1-1 . ) (CAIB 2003:123) 
The automatic highlighting shown above makes it very 
easy for the reader to see quickly what concerns are 
relevant to "foam". 
Phrase review 
Another way to identify concepts importantly related to 
"foam" is to extract and list phrases from relevant text 
using Perilog's phrase review tool. Here are phrases that 
occur at least twice in the preceding "foam" paragraph. 
7 FOAM LOSS  
4 LEFT BIPOD  
3 BIPOD RAMP  
2 BIPOD AREA  
2 BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS  
2 EXTERNAL TANK  
2 LEFT BIPOD RAMP  
Shown below are the phrases that occur at least 5 times in 
the 25 paragraphs that are most relevant to "foam". The 
25 paragraphs are the most relevant among the 121 
paragraphs found earlier by a keyword-in-context search 
on the word "foam". 
50 FOAM LOSS  
35 BIPOD RAMP  
30 EXTERNAL TANK  
15 BIPOD FOAM  
15 BIPOD RAMP FOAM  
15 FLIGHT ANOMALY  
15 LEFT BIPOD  
12 LEFT BIPOD RAMP  
10 EXTERNAL TANK PROJECT  
10 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW  
10 FOAM - SHEDDING  
10 SHUTTLE PROGRAM  
9 BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS  
7 BIPOD FOAM LOSS  
7 FLIGHT ISSUE  
7 FOAM STRIKE  
7 SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT  
7 SAFETY OF FLIGHT  
7 THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM  
6 LEFT BIPOD RAMP FOAM  
6 PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS CONTROL BOARD 
6 RIGHT BIPOD  
5 ACCEPTED RISK  
5 BIPOD LOSS  
5 INTEGRATION OFFICE  
5 KNOWN BIPOD  
5 STS-113 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW 
Phrase search 
The above list of phrases, extracted from text relevant to 
"foam", suggests query phrases that can be used to find 
text relevant to particular "foam"-related concerns. Many 
of the phrases involve the physical circumstances of the 
accident, such as "foam loss" and "bipod ramp". Others 
represent broad safety concerns, such as "safety of flight" 
and "accepted risk". Two other phrases stand out due to 
their length, specificity, and references to the human and 
organizational circumstances of the accident. These are: 
"program requirements control board" and "STS-113 
flight readiness review".  
When a Perilog phrase search is performed using the 
latter two phrases as a query, 35 relevant paragraphs are 
found. Shown below is the most relevant paragraph 
(including its immediately preceding section title, as 
explained in appendix 1): 
STS-113 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW : A PIVOTAL 
DECISION - BECAUSE THE BIPOD RAMP SHEDDING ON 
STS-112 WAS SIGNIFICANT , BOTH IN SIZE AND IN THE 
DAMAGE IT CAUSED , AND BECAUSE IT OCCURRED 
ONLY TWO FLIGHTS BEFORE STS-107 , THE BOARD 
INVESTIGATED NASA 'S RATIONALE TO CONTINUE 
FLYING . THIS DECISION MADE BY THE PROGRAM 
REQUIREMENTS CONTROL BOARD AT THE STS-113 
FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW IS AMONG THOSE MOST 
DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE STS-107 ACCIDENT . HAD 
THE FOAM LOSS DURING STS-112 BEEN CLASSIFIED 
AS A MORE SERIOUS THREAT , MANAGERS MIGHT 
HAVE RESPONDED DIFFERENTLY WHEN THEY HEARD 
ABOUT THE FOAM STRIKE ON STS-107 . 
ALTERNATELY , IN THE FACE OF THE INCREASED 
RISK , STS-107 MIGHT NOT HAVE FLOWN AT ALL . 
HOWEVER , AT STS-113 'S FLIGHT READINESS 
REVIEW , MANAGERS FORMALLY ACCEPTED A 
FLIGHT RATIONALE THAT STATED IT WAS SAFE TO 
FLY WITH FOAM LOSSES . THIS DECISION ENABLED , 
AND PERHAPS EVEN ENCOURAGED , MISSION 
MANAGEMENT TEAM MEMBERS TO USE SIMILAR 
REASONING WHEN EVALUATING WHETHER THE 
FOAM STRIKE ON STS-107 POSED A SAFETY - OF - 
FLIGHT ISSUE .  (CAIB 2003:125) 
The retrieved text is highly relevant to concerns about 
"foam" in the context of "program requirements control 
board" and "STS-113 flight readiness review". It 
describes "a pivotal decision, despite foam losses, to 
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continue flying. As stated in the above CAIB paragraph, 
"This decision made by the Program Requirements 
Control Board at the STS-113 Flight Readiness Review is 
among those most directly linked to the STS-107 
accident." (CAIB 2003:125).  
(Note that Perilog's flexible phrase search recognizes the 
match between the phrase "STS-113's flight readiness 
review" with the possessive "STS-113's" and the query 
phrase "STS-113 flight readiness review" without the 
possessive. While this might seem unremarkable, many 
state-of-the-art phrase search tools cannot recognize near-
matches.) 
Summary of this example 
Using Perilog, it was just a few steps from first 
identifying "flight" and "foam" as significant words to 
finding an important passage about decision making. The 
example does not suggest, however, that this sequence of 
searches is the only or the best way to explore the text. 
One might well have started with a keyword-in-context 
search on "decision", a key word from the chapter title. 
The important point here is that significant insights can be 
gained by using Perilog text mining tools in concert, 
following one of the suggested sequences illustrated in 
figure 1.  
In this example, the vocabulary review tool identified the 
two most prominent words as "flight" and "foam". 
Keyword-in-context searches found paragraphs that are 
highly relevant to "flight" and "foam" in context. Phrase 
review found a collection of phrases that are contextually 
and situationally associated with "foam". Finally, the 
selected phrases "program requirements control board" 
and "STS-113 flight readiness review" were used as 
queries in Perilog's flexible phrase search to find text 
relevant to these "foam"-related concerns.  
Those already familiar with the findings of the CAIB 
report will not be surprised that "foam" is highly 
associated with "foam loss", "bipod ramp", "external 
tank", "safety of flight", "thermal protection system", 
"program requirements control board", "STS-113 flight 
readiness review", etc. Further, careful readers will 
already appreciate the important connection between the 
Program Requirements Control Board and the STS-113 
Flight Readiness Review. What Perilog offers even the 
most careful reader, however, is a tool kit for achieving 
this level of insight even when documents are unfamiliar, 
very long, and very detailed. This example illustrates how 
quickly and easily it can be done.  
From foam to in-flight anomaly 1983-2003 
Another sequence of Perilog tool use is illustrated in this 
second example: vocabulary review, phrase generation, 
phrase search, and search by example. 
Vocabulary review 
As observed earlier, a review of the vocabulary of the 
CAIB chapter on "Decision Making at NASA" shows the 
word "foam" to be particularly prominent. (See table on 
page 2.) 
Phrase generation 
To gain a better understanding of a document, it can be 
helpful to find specific concepts involving a particularly 
prominent word such as "foam". Perilog's phrase 
generation tool provides this assistance. Shown below are 
the top 20 generated phrases containing the word "foam".  
102 FOAM STRIKE 
102 FOAM LOSS 
102 BIPOD FOAM 
70 FOAM SHEDDING 
67 RAMP FOAM 
64 BIPOD RAMP FOAM 
57 BIPOD FOAM LOSS 
43 STS-112 FOAM 
32 FOAM DEBRIS 
30 FOAM LOSSES 
30 ET FOAM 
29 RAMP FOAM LOSS 
29 FOAM DEBRIS STRIKE 
22 FOAM STRIKES 
21 FOAM DEBRIS STRIKES 
20 STS-112 FOAM LOSS 
15 MISSING FOAM 
14 FOAM OCCURRED 
14 FOAM EVENT 
14 BIPOD FOAM SHEDDING 
Generated phrases are not extracted from the text, but are 
inferred from a network model of the text. As a 
consequence, the output of phrase generation is a list of 
phrases that are likely to occur in the text, with the more 
likely phrases appearing toward the top of the list. The 
numerical values are a rough estimate of frequency within 
the entire database of paragraphs. In addition, the phrase 
list is compressed, so that, for example, "foam shedding" 
represents both "foam shedding" and "foam-shedding". 
These phrases provide significant insights into the nature 
of "foam"-related concerns in the document. They can be 
used directly to discover, for example, that "foam strike", 
"foam loss", and "bipod foam" are among the greatest 
"foam"-related concerns. The other phrases provide 
additional specificity. Thus, phrase generation converts a 
simple input word to a list of specific concepts involving 
the word. 
Phrase search 
As a next step, any number of these phrases can be used 
as a query to find paragraphs containing them. To do so, 
the phrases can be copied, with or without the numerical 
values, from the output of phrase generation to the input 
of phrase search. 
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When the first three phrases, "foam strike", "foam loss", 
and "bipod foam" are used as a query to phrase search, 84 
relevant paragraphs are found. The most relevant of these 
paragraphs is the following: 
COLUMBIA : CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE - STS-112 FLEW 
IN OCTOBER 2002 . AT 33 SECONDS INTO THE FLIGHT , 
A PIECE OF THE BIPOD FOAM FROM THE EXTERNAL 
TANK STRUCK ONE OF THE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
. AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 6.1 , THE STS-112 FOAM 
STRIKE WAS DISCUSSED AT THE PROGRAM 
REQUIREMENTS CONTROL BOARD FOLLOWING THE 
FLIGHT . ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL RECOMMENDATION 
WAS TO TREAT THE FOAM LOSS AS AN IN - FLIGHT 
ANOMALY , THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM INSTEAD 
ASSIGNED IT AS AN ACTION , WITH A DUE DATE 
AFTER THE NEXT LAUNCH . ( THIS WAS THE FIRST 
INSTANCE OF BIPOD FOAM LOSS THAT WAS NOT 
DESIGNATED AN IN - FLIGHT ANOMALY . ) THE 
ACTION WAS NOTED AT THE STS-113 FLIGHT 
READINESS REVIEW . THOSE FLIGHT READINESS 
REVIEW CHARTS ( SEE SECTION 6.1 ) PROVIDED A 
FLAWED FLIGHT RATIONALE BY CONCLUDING THAT 
THE FOAM LOSS WAS " NOT A SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT " 
ISSUE  .  (CAIB 2003:137) 
When the top 20 phrases returned by phrase generation 
are used as a query to phrase search, along with their 
numerical weights, 136 paragraphs are found to be 
relevant. The following text, which is from a table (CAIB 
2003: 128, figure 6.1-7), is the most relevant. It 
summarizes bipod foam loss incidents dating from 1983 
to 2003. 
MISSION DATE COMMENTS STS-1 APRIL 12 , 1981 LOTS 
OF DEBRIS DAMAGE . 300 TILES REPLACED . STS-7 
JUNE 18 , 1983 FIRST KNOWN LEFT BIPOD RAMP 
FOAM SHEDDING EVENT . STS-27R DECEMBER 2 , 
1988 DEBRIS KNOCKS OFF TILE ; STRUCTURAL 
DAMAGE AND NEAR BURN THROUGH RESULTS . STS-
32R JANUARY 9 , 1990 SECOND KNOWN LEFT BIPOD 
RAMP FOAM EVENT . STS-35 DECEMBER 2 , 1990 
FIRST TIME NASA CALLS FOAM DEBRIS " SAFETY OF 
FLIGHT ISSUE , " AND " RE - USE OR TURNAROUND 
ISSUE . " STS-42 JANUARY 22 , 1992 FIRST MISSION 
AFTER WHICH THE NEXT MISSION ( STS-45 ) 
LAUNCHED WITHOUT DEBRIS IN - FLIGHT ANOMALY 
CLOSURE / RESOLUTION . STS-45 MARCH 24 , 1992 
DAMAGE TO WING RCC PANEL 10-RIGHT . 
UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY , " MOST LIKELY ORBITAL 
DEBRIS . " STS-50 JUNE 25 , 1992 THIRD KNOWN BIPOD 
RAMP FOAM EVENT . HAZARD REPORT 37 : AN " 
ACCEPTED RISK . " STS-52 OCTOBER 22 , 1992 
UNDETECTED BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS ( FOURTH 
BIPOD EVENT ) . STS-56 APRIL 8 , 1993 ACREAGE TILE 
DAMAGE ( LARGE AREA ) . CALLED " WITHIN 
EXPERIENCE BASE " AND CONSIDERED " IN FAMILY . " 
STS-62 OCTOBER 4 , 1994 UNDETECTED BIPOD RAMP 
FOAM LOSS ( FIFTH BIPOD EVENT ) . STS-87 
NOVEMBER 19 , 1997 DAMAGE TO ORBITER THERMAL 
PROTECTION SYSTEM SPURS NASA TO BEGIN 9 
FLIGHT TESTS TO RESOLVE FOAM - SHEDDING . 
FOAM FIX INEFFECTIVE . IN - FLIGHT ANOMALY 
EVENTUALLY CLOSED AFTER STS-101 AS " ACCEPTED 
RISK . " STS-112 OCTOBER 7 , 2002 SIXTH KNOWN LEFT 
BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS . FIRST TIME MAJOR 
DEBRIS EVENT NOT ASSIGNED AN IN - FLIGHT 
ANOMALY . EXTERNAL TANK PROJECT WAS 
ASSIGNED AN ACTION . NOT CLOSED OUT UNTIL 
AFTER STS-113 AND STS-107 . STS-107 JANUARY 16 , 
2003 COLUMBIA LAUNCH . SEVENTH KNOWN LEFT 
BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS EVENT .  (CAIB 2003:128) 
(See appendix 1 regarding table formats and units of text. 
While all of the text from the table is treated as a single 
paragraph in this exercise, it could have been treated as 
multiple paragraphs when setting up the database.) 
About phrase matching 
In the above CAIB paragraph, phrases that match the 
query phrases are highlighted. For example, the 
highlighted phrase "foam debris" directly matches the 
query phrase "foam debris", and the highlighted phrase 
"foam-shedding" (with a dash) flexibly matches the query 
phrase "foam shedding" (without a dash). Sometimes two 
or more short matches reveal longer phrases, as when 
phrases in a paragraph match query phrases by 
overlapping one or more of the query  words. For 
example, this long, highlighted phrase from the 
paragraph: 
bipod ramp foam event 
matches the following query phrases (spaced for word-by-
word alignment with the long phrase above): 
bipod   foam 
  ramp foam 
bipod ramp foam 
foam event 
With longer phrases, matching can be even more 
complex. For example, this long, highlighted phrase from 
the paragraph: 
bipod ramp foam shedding event
flexibly matches the following query phrases (spaced for 
word-by-word alignment with the long phrase above): 
bipod   foam 
    foam shedding 
  ramp foam 
bipod ramp foam 
    foam    event 
bipod   foam shedding 
These results illustrate the power and benefit of flexible 
matching in Perilog phrase search. 
Search by example (1 of 2) 
Any text, such as a CAIB report paragraph containing 
"foam" related text, can be used as a query to Perilog's 
search by example. One option is to base the search on all 
6 
of the phrase structure in the query text (not just the 
highlighted phrases). For example, the paragraph found 
earlier, from a table which summarizes bipod foam losses 
from 1983 to 2003, can be used as a query. That 
paragraph, shown in its entirety on page 6, begins: 
MISSION DATE COMMENTS STS-1 APRIL 12 , 1981 LOTS 
OF DEBRIS DAMAGE . 300 TILES REPLACED . STS-7 
JUNE 18 , 1983 FIRST KNOWN LEFT BIPOD RAMP 
FOAM SHEDDING EVENT . (CAIB 2003:128) 
A search by example using the entire paragraph as a 
query finds 199 relevant paragraphs. The most relevant 
paragraph is, of course, the one used as a query. The 
second most relevant paragraph is shown below. It 
describes the first bipod foam loss incident in 1983 and 
shows that it was considered to be an in-flight anomaly at 
the time. This paragraph is most like the query paragraph 
with respect to the matching phrases it contains. The 
phrases highlighted by Perilog in this paragraph are also 
found in some form in the query paragraph. 
THE FIRST KNOWN BIPOD RAMP FOAM LOSS 
OCCURRED DURING STS-7 , CHALLENGER 'S SECOND 
MISSION ( SEE FIGURE 6.1-2 ) . IMAGES TAKEN AFTER 
EXTERNAL TANK SEPARATION REVEALED THAT A 19 
- BY 12-INCH PIECE OF THE LEFT BIPOD RAMP WAS 
MISSING , AND THAT THE EXTERNAL TANK HAD 
SOME 25 SHALLOW DIVOTS IN THE FOAM JUST 
FORWARD OF THE BIPOD STRUTS AND ANOTHER 40 
DIVOTS IN THE FOAM COVERING THE LOWER 
EXTERNAL TANK . AFTER THE MISSION WAS 
COMPLETED , THE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
CONTROL BOARD CITED THE FOAM LOSS AS AN IN - 
FLIGHT ANOMALY . CITING AN EVENT AS AN IN - 
FLIGHT ANOMALY MEANS THAT BEFORE THE NEXT 
LAUNCH , A SPECIFIC NASA ORGANIZATION MUST 
RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OR PROVE THAT IT DOES 
NOT THREATEN THE SAFETY OF THE VEHICLE OR 
CREW . (CAIB 2003:123) 
This paragraph not only contains "foam" phrases from the 
full text of the query paragraph, including "first known 
bipod ramp foam loss", "left bipod ramp", and "foam 
loss", it also contains the matching phrases "external 
tank" and "flight anomaly", which are related to the topic 
of "foam" but do not contain the word "foam". 
The longer phrase "in-flight anomaly" is only matched as 
"flight anomaly" in this example because the word "in" 
was included among the stopwords. Phrases whose first or 
last word is a stopword are properly accounted for in the 
Perilog methods, as documented in the patents, but they 
remain to be fully addressed by the current 
implementation in software. 
Search by example (2 of 2) 
The above CAIB paragraph, which describes the first 
bipod foam loss incident, can itself be used as a query to 
search by example. The following paragraph is found to 
be the most relevant (after the original query paragraph). 
It is about the most recent foam loss incident, on STS-
107, and indicates that the occurrence was considered to 
be an in-flight anomaly. 
THE SEVENTH AND FINAL KNOWN BIPOD RAMP 
FOAM LOSS OCCURRED ON JANUARY 16 , 2003 , 
DURING THE LAUNCH OF COLUMBIA ON STS-107 . 
AFTER THE COLUMBIA BIPOD LOSS , THE PROGRAM 
REQUIREMENTS CONTROL BOARD DEEMED THE 
FOAM LOSS AN IN - FLIGHT ANOMALY TO BE DEALT 
WITH BY THE EXTERNAL TANK PROJECT . (CAIB 
2003:126) 
This and the previously retrieved paragraphs show that 
despite the characterization of bipod ramp foam loss as an 
in-flight anomaly as early as STS-7, launched June 18, 
1983, it was again characterized as an in-flight anomaly 
on the ill-fated flight of Columbia on STS-107 nearly 20 
years later. During the intervening years, despite 
numerous similar incidents of foam loss, NASA did not 
"resolve the problem or prove that it does not threaten the 
safety of the vehicle or crew." (CAIB 2003: 123) 
Summary of this example 
This significant insight was quickly achieved by using 
Perilog tools in concert. The word "foam" was found by 
vocabulary review to be prominent, and phrase generation 
produced a list of prominent phrases containing the word 
"foam". These phrases were input to phrase search to find 
paragraphs in which the "foam" phrases are prominent. 
The most relevant of these paragraphs, which summarizes 
bipod foam loss incidents, was then used in its entirety as 
input to search by example in order to find paragraphs 
that not only contain the previously identified "foam" 
phrases but are also relevant to associated concerns such 
as "flight anomaly" and "external tank". The most 
relevant of the retrieved paragraphs describes bipod ramp 
foam loss on STS-7 in 1983 as an in-flight anomaly. This 
paragraph was itself used as another input to search by 
example to find a paragraph showing that bipod ramp 
foam loss was found to be an in-flight anomaly on STS-
107 in 2003. Thus, in a series of simple steps, Perilog 
found significant safety-critical concerns about "foam" 
within the context of "Decision Making at NASA. 
Conditions and contingencies: if p then q 
While the two previous examples demonstrate how 
Perilog tools can be used in concert for knowledge 
discovery, this final example demonstrates Perilog's 
utility in a different way. One difference is that the 
previous examples use Perilog to find text passages that 
are highly relevant to various kinds of things present in 
the world, such as "foam", "bipod ramp foam shedding 
event", and "Program Requirements Control Board". In 
contrast, this final example uses Perilog to find instances 
of a particular kind of statement about the world, 
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conditional statements, and shows how one such 
statement might be evaluated. Conditional statements, 
which are typically found in the form "if p then q, are an 
essential part of the structure of decision making.  
Further, while the first two examples concentrate on the 
Perilog tools and the text that they retrieve, this final 
example concentrates on a detailed analysis of a single 
example of a conditional statement found by Perilog. The 
purpose of this example is to show the potential value of 
finding and analyzing conditional statements. Rather than 
merely continuing to show the already demonstrated 
power of Perilog to retrieve highly relevant text, this 
example shows how that power can support analysis of 
decision making. 
A Perilog keyword-in-context search on the word "if" in 
the CAIB report chapter "Decision Making at NASA" is 
useful for finding important conditional statements, and 
the conditions and contingencies that they contain, which 
are factors in decision making. These factors can be used 
in modeling the network of logical inferences that led to 
particular decisions. This example shows a small but 
representative part of such a network. 
Performing the keyword-in-context search using the word 
"if" as a query produces paragraphs ranked on relevance 
to "if" in the context of words like "ask", "asked", 
"asking", "launch", "determine", "could", "see", 
"damage", "RCC", and "managers". For example, here are 
the two most relevant paragraphs, with occurrences of "if" 
highlighted.  
MCCORMACK : " RIGHT , IT COULD POTENTIALLY HIT 
THE RCC AND WE DON'T INDICATE ANY OTHER 
POSSIBLE COATING DAMAGE OR SOMETHING , WE 
DON'T SEE ANY ISSUE IF IT HIT THE RCC . ALTHOUGH 
WE COULD HAVE SOME SIGNIFICANT TILE DAMAGE  
IF WE DON'T SEE A SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUE . " 
(CAIB 2003:161) 
ACCORDING TO BOEING ANALYSTS WHO WERE 
MEMBERS OF THE DEBRIS ASSESSMENT TEAM , 
SCHOMBURG CALLED TO ASK ABOUT THEIR 
RATIONALE FOR PURSUING IMAGERY . THE BOEING 
ANALYSTS TOLD HIM THAT SOMETHING THE SIZE OF 
A LARGE COOLER HAD HIT THE ORBITER AT 500 
MILES PER HOUR . PRESSED FOR ADDITIONAL 
REASONS AND NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING WHY 
THEIR ORIGINAL JUSTIFICATION WAS INSUFFICIENT , 
THE ANALYSTS SAID THAT AT LEAST THEY WOULD 
KNOW WHAT HAPPENED IF SOMETHING WERE TO GO 
TERRIBLY WRONG . THE BOEING ANALYSTS NEXT 
ASKED WHY THEY WERE WORKING SO HARD 
ANALYZING POTENTIAL DAMAGE AREAS IF SHUTTLE 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BELIEVED THE DAMAGE 
WAS MINOR AND THAT NO SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT 
ISSUES EXISTED . SCHOMBURG REPLIED THAT THE 
ANALYSTS WERE NEW AND WOULD LEARN FROM 
THIS EXERCISE . (CAIB 2003:160) 
Text relevant to the word "if" in context, such as these 
two CAIB report paragraphs, can be useful, as shown 
below, for: 1) identifying conditions and contingencies 
that are explicitly at issue in a document; 2) comparing 
the explicitly given contingencies with implicit 
contingencies; 3) building decision networks; and 4) 
evaluating the validity of conditional statements relating 
conditions and contingencies. 
Example of if p then q 
As an example, the passage from the first paragraph, "we 
don't see any issue if it hit the RCC", will be analyzed 
here in some detail. For this exercise, detailed analysis 
will not include the entire passage, but only the part that 
is underlined here: "IT COULD POTENTIALLY HIT THE 
RCC AND WE DON'T INDICATE ANY OTHER POSSIBLE 
COATING DAMAGE OR SOMETHING , WE DON'T SEE 
ANY ISSUE IF IT HIT THE RCC . ALTHOUGH WE COULD 
HAVE SOME SIGNIFICANT TILE DAMAGE  IF WE DON'T 
SEE A SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUE . " It could be argued 
that the meaning of the whole passage is, "If it hit the 
RCC and we don't indicate any other possible coating 
damage or something, then we don't see any safety-of-
flight issue, but we might still have significant tile 
damage. The analysis of the selected passage does not, 
however, depend upon the actual or possible lack of 
indications of damage because indications are causally 
posterior to the state of the RCC, and it is the question of 
whether the RCC was actually damaged that is central to 
the analysis, as discussed below.  
Before getting into the example, some explanation is 
needed. In the paragraph from which the analyzed 
passage is taken, "McCormack" is the manager of the 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER), "a support function of 
the Shuttle Program Office that supplies engineering 
expertise for missions in progress" (CAIB 2003: 141). 
The quote is from his briefing on STS-107 flight day nine 
(Friday, January 24, 2003) to the Mission Management 
Team. "RCC" is reinforced carbon-carbon, which protects 
the leading edge of the Orbiter's wing from thermal 
damage during re-entry. The "it" in "if it hit the RCC, 
refers to foam insulation that was shed from the External 
Tank during launch.  
In addition, a few definitions are needed. Contingencies 
are possible situations or events that are dependent upon 
potentially variable conditions, which are themselves 
situations or events. A conditional statement of the form 
"if p then q, "if p, q, or "q if p" asserts that contingency 
q is situationally related to, and contingent upon, 
condition p. Thus, if condition p is true or exists or 
occurs, then one can justifiably infer that contingency q is 
also true or exists or occurs, as long as the conditional 
statement "if p then q, "if p, q, or "q if p, a conditional 
relation between p and q, is a valid relation. 
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Given these definitions, the example passage is a 
conditional statement that relates the contingency q ("we 
don't see any issue") and the condition p ("it hit the 
RCC"), in the form of a logical relation "q if p. The 
passage can also be rewritten in the form "if p then q" as 
follows: "if it hit the RCC [then] we don't see any issue. 
In either form, the meaning is the same.  
The passage is an assertion that a consequence of foam 
hitting the RCC would be that the MER wouldn't see a 
safety-of-flight issue. Is this a valid assertion?  
As is now known, the condition was true: foam had 
indeed hit the RCC. The contingency was also true: the 
MER, as managed by McCormack, did in fact conclude 
that there was no safety-of-flight issue. The problem is 
that the contingency is not logically implied by the 
condition, given the facts of the situation, as will be 
shown in detail below. The assertion is therefore invalid.  
The invalidity is not due to the fact that the MER's 
conclusion was not a direct consequence of the fact that 
foam hit the RCC. The assertion was offered as a 
summary of a more detailed chain of reasoning. It reports 
an input and an output of the MER's deliberations. That 
is, given the condition of a foam strike on the RCC as 
input to the MER, an output of the MER was a conclusion 
that it was not seen as a safety-of-flight issue. Such a 
summary is perfectly acceptable, even desirable. The 
invalidity is that, given the facts of the situation, there is 
no logical chain of reasoning that leads from the input to 
the output. This is not news, as the CAIB has essentially 
come to that conclusion. The purpose of addressing the 
invalidity here is to explicitly show how a plausible fact-
based chain of reasoning can be subverted by introduction 
of belief-based reasoning.  
Analysis of the assertion 
As shown in figure 2 on page 10 and the corresponding 
discussion below, directly relating the condition "it [i.e., 
foam] hit the RCC" and the contingency "we don't see 
any [safety-of-flight] issue" obscures and bypasses 
intervening situational possibilities, vitally important 
possible states of the world, which are fundamentally 
important contingencies of the condition "it hit the RCC. 
These obscured situational possibilities should have been 
the conditions upon which safety-of-flight judgments 
were based.  
Specifically, there are several situational possibilities that 
are immediately and directly contingent upon the 
condition that foam hit the RCC, including: 1) the foam 
damaged the RCC (and this fact is known); 2) the foam 
did not damage the RCC (and this fact is known); and 3) 
it is uncertain whether the foam damaged the RCC.  
These possibilities can be shown as mutually exclusive 
conditional relations (ri) between conditions (pi) and 
contingencies (qi):  
r1: if p1 then q1: If foam hit the RCC, then foam 
damaged the RCC (and this fact is known). 
r2: if p2 then q2: If foam hit the RCC, then foam did 
not damage the RCC (and this fact is known). 
r3: if p3 then q3: If foam hit the RCC, then it is 
uncertain whether foam damaged the RCC. 
Note that p1=p2=p3. This single condition has three 
contingencies: q1, q2, and q3. Thus, an alternative form 
of the above relations would be: if p1 then q1, q2, or q3, 
where "or" is an exclusive "or. 
Recall that the broader passage appeared to contain a 
condition that is the logical conjunction of "it [foam] hit 
the RCC" and "we don't indicate any other possible 
coating damage or something. Thus, according to that 
conjunction, there are three possible situations: 
1) foam damaged the RCC (and this fact is known) and 
we don't indicate any other possible coating damage or 
something, or 
2) foam did not damage the RCC (and this fact is known) 
and we don't indicate any other possible coating damage 
or something, or 
3) it is uncertain whether foam damaged the RCC and we 
don't indicate any other possible coating damage or 
something. 
That is to say, the conjunction of "we don't indicate any 
other possible coating damage or something" with "it 
[foam] hit the RCC" does not change the situation with 
respect to the actual condition of the RCC. At the risk of 
explaining the obvious, this is because an indication is 
causally posterior to that which is indicated. For example, 
an indication of a sensor measuring heat is caused by the 
heat; the indication does not cause the heat. Thus, it is the 
condition of the RCC that causally determines the safety-
of-flight, as shown below, not the indications.  
The contingencies q1, q2, and q3 of the preceding 
relations r1, r2, and r3 are themselves situational 
conditions upon which safety-of-flight judgments are 
contingent. For example, contingency q1 ("foam damaged 
the RCC") in relation r1 is contingent upon p1 ("foam hit 
the RCC"), whereas the condition "foam damaged the 
RCC" has the contingency "it is a safety-of-flight issue. 
Accordingly, in the following relations (r4, r5, r6), 
contingencies q1, q2, and q3 above are renumbered as 
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Figure 2. Analysis of the assertion: "If it [i.e.,  foam] hit the RCC, [then] we don't see any [safety-of-flight] issue" and its 
implicit conditions and contingencies, showing how belief can short–circuit logic. The conditions and contingencies all 
correspond to actual or potential states of the world. Each link ri is a logical relation between a condition pi and a 
contingency qi (i=1..9). Links r2' and r5' are belief relations. Contingency q2' is a belief related to condition p1=p2=p3. 
Condition p5' is a belief related to contingency q8. 
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conditions p4, p5, and p6 respectively, each with its own 
contingency (q4, q5, q6): 
r4: if p4 then q4: If foam damaged the RCC (and this 
fact is known), then it is a safety-of-flight issue. 
r5: if p5 then q5: If foam did not damage the RCC (and 
this fact is known), then it is not a safety-of-flight 
issue. 
r6: if p6 then q6: If it is uncertain whether foam 
damaged the RCC, then it cannot be determined 
whether it is a safety-of-flight issue without more 
evidence. 
There must also be relations which relate states of the 
world regarding safety to states of the world regarding 
perceptions of safety. For example, in an ideal world: 
r7: if p7 then q7: If it is a safety-of-flight issue, then we 
see a safety-of-flight issue. 
r8: if p8 then q8: If it is not a safety-of-flight issue, then 
we do not see a safety-of-flight issue. 
r9: if p9 then q9: If it cannot be determined whether it 
is a safety-of-flight issue without more evidence, 
then we cannot see whether it is a safety-of-flight 
issue without more evidence. 
Note that the contingencies q4, q5 and q6 in relations r4, 
r5, and r6 became conditions p7, p8 and p9 respectively 
in relations r7, r8, and r9. 
The nine relations r1-r9 are diagrammed in figure 2 on 
page 10. 
Interpretation of the logic of the assertion 
In order to be justified in asserting that "we do not see a 
safety-of-flight issue" based on the network of logical 
relations r1 through r9, the conditions p2, p5, and p8 
would have to be true. That is, given that foam actually 
hit the RCC (p2), it would also have to be true that foam 
really did not damage the RCC (q2). Further, if foam 
really did not damage the RCC (p5), then by definition 
(r5) it is not a safety-of-flight issue (q5), and if it is not a 
safety-of-flight issue (p8), then we do not see a safety-of-
flight issue (q8). 
Unfortunately, it was not known, at the time the assertion 
was made, whether foam damaged the RCC. 
In fact, conditions p3, p6, and p9 were true. That is, foam 
actually hit the RCC (p3), but it was uncertain whether 
foam damaged the RCC (q3/p6), so it could not be 
determined whether it was a safety-of-flight issue without 
more evidence (q6/p9). One can only logically conclude, 
according to this set of situationally justified logical 
relations, that "we cannot see whether it is a safety-of-
flight issue without more evidence" (q9). There is no 
logical path from condition p6, not knowing whether the 
RCC was damaged, to q8 ("we do not see a safety-of-
flight issue"). 
How is it possible to come to the conclusion that "we do 
not see a safety-of-flight issue" without knowing whether 
foam damaged the RCC? According to the CAIB's 
conclusions (CAIB 2003:168), 
"Program managers ... gradually become inured to 
external tank foam losses and on a fundamental level 
did not believe foam striking the vehicle posed a critical 
threat to the orbiter. In particular, Shuttle managers 
exhibited a belief that RCC panels are impervious to 
foam impacts." 
(See appendix 2 for this and other excerpts relevant to 
belief.) 
Thus, given the condition "foam hit the RCC, the 
contingency q2 "foam did not damage the RCC" was 
believed to be true, even in the absence of sufficient 
evidence about the current state of the world, because it 
was believed, based on prior experience, that foam cannot 
damage the RCC. Thus the belief is: "foam did not 
damage the RCC because foam cannot damage the RCC." 
This belief seems to have resulted from an unjustified 
faith in induction such that a small set of repeated 
experiences was interpreted as a universal law.  
The pre-existing belief could have been reinforced by 
conjunction with the condition, if it were the case, that 
"we don't indicate any other possible coating damage or 
something, but the belief was not based on these 
indications. Further, not all available indications were 
examined, and the remaining subset of available 
indications was insufficient to judge the state of the RCC. 
Thus, in this case, a lack of indication of damage would 
not imply an actual lack of damage, although it might 
seem reassuringly supportive of the belief. An 
unambiguous positive indication of damage, however, 
such as a clear photograph of the leading edge of 
Columbia's left wing, would have strongly challenged the 
belief. 
The assertion that "if foam hit the RCC, then we don't see 
a safety-of-flight issue" can be expanded to make explicit 
the underlying belief, and the belief relations, as shown 
below. The belief relations are designated r2' and r5'. 
r2': if p2 then q2': If foam hit the RCC, then foam did 
not damage the RCC because foam cannot damage 
the RCC. 
r5': if p5' then q5: If  foam did not damage the RCC 
because foam cannot damage the RCC, then we do 
not see a safety-of-flight issue. 
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(Note that the contingency q2' of relation r2' becomes the 
condition p5' of relation r5'). 
The belief relations r2' and r5' are not situationally 
justified logical assertions but belief-based assertions. 
These relations and the intervening belief node (q2'/p5') 
cause a short circuit in the structure of situationally 
justified logical assertions, as illustrated in figure 2, by 
illogically linking the condition "if foam hit the RCC" and 
the contingency "we don't see a safety-of-flight issue. 
The perception of safety is achieved through belief rather 
than by determining the situational state of the world 
regarding damage to the RCC and judging accordingly. 
Finally, it is important to understand that this example 
serves only as a simple illustration. It is not, nor is it 
intended to be, a definitive analysis. The actual network 
of logical and belief relations operative during STS-107 
was vastly more subtle and complex, even for the subset 
of concerns addressed here.  
Summary regarding "if-then" analysis 
This example illustrates an approach to constructing and 
evaluating a decision making network based on the facts 
of the accident and the conditional statements found in the 
text of the accident report.  A Perilog keyword-in-context 
search on the query word "if" was conducted to find and 
relevance-rank the passages that contain conditional 
statements, and the top-ranking one was used as the basis 
of the example analysis. That analysis shows how a belief 
can bypass essential conditions and contingencies. A 
more detailed analysis would include more of the 
available conditional statements. Accordingly, some of 
the most relevant "if" clauses (excerpts containing "if" 
and a condition) found by Perilog are listed in appendices 
3 and 4. The corresponding contingencies are to be found 
in context in the full text of the report. In addition, belief-
related passages found by Perilog are listed in appendix 2. 
These elements can serve as input for further elaboration 
of the structure of decision making at NASA during the 
final flight of Columbia. 
Conclusion 
Accident reports provide a valuable safety resource when 
they are read and understood, but they have significant 
additional value when they can be analyzed and explored 
using text mining operations. Perilog text mining tools 
can be very usefully applied for this purpose, as has been 
illustrated by several examples of its application to 
chapter 6,  "Decision Making at NASA, of the final 
report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
(CAIB). Perilog makes it easy for users to find highly 
significant safety-related topics and concerns, even if a 
user has no initial knowledge of those topics and 
concerns. That is, Perilog search capabilities do not 
require a user to know in advance what they are looking 
for, because Perilog is highly effective as a knowledge 
discovery tool.  
In addition, as suggested by the third example, Perilog 
can be used to find significant narrative evidence, in the 
form of conditional statements, for analysis of decision 
making. These statements, typically of the form "if p then 
q, are assertions that condition p implies contingency q. 
While the judgments of experts and expert groups such as 
the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) have the effect of 
asserting relations between conditions and contingencies 
that serve as the basis of decision making, the example 
analysis shows how belief relations can bypass logical 
relations. To make better decisions, the logical structure 
of decision making must be examined, and belief relations 
must be identified and eliminated at the very time when 
decisions are being made. Given such a requirement, the 
logic of mission-critical decision making should be 
rigorously diagrammed and analyzed in real time. Thus, 
when forming or taking the advice of expert individuals 
or groups in these situations, verbal assertions relating 
conditions to contingencies should only be formally 
accepted after thorough, documented analysis by an 
unbiased team of decision making experts. Such a team 
would most likely be managed by the independent NASA 
Engineering Safety Center (NESC). 
In support of this and related uses, Perilog can contribute 
to mission success by providing unique and valuable 
capabilities for text mining of mission documentation. In 
fact, at the request of the Systems Engineering Office of  
the NESC, a copy of the Perilog text mining software was 
transferred to NESC for application to their databases 
containing unstructured text. (Perilog was delivered under 
a Federal Government Transfer Letter, Reference No. 
SUA2-000904, on August 2, 2004.) The NESC databases 
include Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
(PRACA) records and mission non-conformance records 
for the Space Station and Space Shuttle, and will contain 
similar records from missions conducted under NASA's 
new Vision for Space Exploration (NASA 2004). Perilog 
is particularly appropriate for application to these 
databases because its unique methods and software 
exploit latent linguistic structure in seemingly 
unstructured text, and work together synergistically, 
enabling highly effective search and retrieval of 
information contained in narrative data. 
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Appendix 1. Processing the CAIB text for input to Perilog.  
This appendix describes how a PDF version of chapter 6 of the CAIB report was pre-processed to convert it into proper 
format for input to Perilog. It can serve as a guide for pre-processing of other PDF files, such as the rest of the CAIB 
report, for input to Perilog. 
Obtaining the PDF file and converting it to text 
Chapter 6 of the CAIB report was downloaded from: 
         http://www.caib.us/news/report/pdf/vol1/chapters/chapter6.pdf 
Using Adobe Reader 6, this file was converted from PDF to text by using the "Save as text..." command in the "File" 
menu. The text file uses the octal 015 character, carriage return, to indicate an end of line, while Unix systems such as 
Mac OS X use the octal 012 character, newline. Consequently, the next step was to convert carriage returns in the text to 
newlines. 
Editing problematic output 
It was discovered that the text output by Adobe Reader from the PDF file contained some sequences of words that were 
concatenated without spaces, including some very long strings. These problems were found to involve text extracted 
from presentation slides ("vugraphs"). The longest such string is the following, which contains 142 continuous 
alphabetic characters and no spaces or line breaks: 
ofReserveProcessingMarginHolidayMarginDrydenReserveRangeCutoutLaunchCutoutLaunchCutout
LaunchCutoutLaunchCutoutLaunchCutoutConstaintsCritical 
The source of this string is the top of the vugraph illustrated in on page 137 of the CAIB report, in chapter 6, figure 6.2-
5, as shown in the following excerpt: 
 
Given this and other problematic text output from Adobe Reader, the output was hand edited. Most of the editing 
involved deleting all text extracted from vugraphs. In addition, the page headers and footers, which were mixed in with 
the text, were removed. Thus, instances of the header "COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD" and 
footer "<page number> Report Volume I August 2003" were deleted. Further, fragments of email messages were found 
to be repeated, so they were removed. Extracted emails that were out of proper sequence with the text were restored to 
their proper positions. For example, the following three passages appeared without the referenced emails, so the emails 
were repositioned to restore the proper sequence. 
The following reply from Campbell to Daugherty was sent at 4:49 p.m. 
 
On the next day, Tuesday, Daugherty sent the following to Campbell. 
 
Campbell•s reply: 
Captions and sidebars were placed by Adobe Reader into the main text in approximately the position where they 
occurred in the original document, and those positions were accepted as placing the information into its appropriate 
context, but if they appeared in the middle of a paragraph, the integrity of the paragraph was restored by moving the 
inserted text out of the paragraph. In some cases, extracted text from a figure caption was placed in the middle of a word 
in the main text. These were repaired during editing.  
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Several other edits were also made. The strings "[continued on next page] and [continued from previous page]" were 
removed. Lines ending in "-" were inspected for word breaks, and broken words were rejoined. As indicated in the Errata 
for Volume 1 (appendix D.b), "Trish Petite" was corrected to "Trish Petete" on page 156. An instance of "Ron 
Dittermore" was corrected to "Ron Dittemore. 
In the process of saving PDF files as text, Adobe Reader's mapping of tables to linearized text gives rows priority, so 
that entire rows of text are mapped, one after the other. This is compatible with tables organized like CAIB report figure 
6.1-7 in which each row contains a unit of information, a record consisting of several fields, because the mapping to 
linearized text maintains the contextual adjacency of the row information. In this case, the extracted text starts as shown 
below, with the first three field types, "MISSION, "DATE, and "COMMENTS, followed by three-line records 
consisting of a mission identifier, a date, and comments: 
MISSION 
DATE 
COMMENTS 
STS-1 
April 12, 1981 
Lots of debris damage. 300 tiles replaced. 
STS-7 
June 18, 1983 
First known left bipod ramp foam shedding event. 
STS-27R 
December 2, 1988 
Debris knocks off tile; structural damage and near burn through results.  
STS-32R 
... 
Adobe Reader's row-priority order is not as compatible with tables like CAIB report figure 6.1-1 in which each column 
contains a unit of information, a record consisting of several fields. In this case, the extracted text starts as shown below, 
with the first field type, "Flight, followed by all of the flight identifiers from the table, then the second field type, "ET 
#,  followed by all of the external tank numbers from the table, etc.: 
Flight 
STS-7 
STS-32R 
STS-50 
STS-52 
STS-62 
STS-112 
STS-107 
ET # 
06 
25 
45  
55  
62 
115  
93 
ET Type 
SWT 
LWT 
... 
Adobe Reader's linearization of PDF tables having a column-oriented format causes the resulting text to be contextually 
grouped by category, as here when flight identifiers appear together, then external tank numbers appear together, etc., 
rather than maintaining the contextual association of information for each flight.  
In summary, of the text that appears in the PDF version of the CAIB report, chapter 6, "Decision Making at NASA, text 
from vugraphs is excluded due to its poor formatting when converted by Adobe Reader, and page headers, page footers, 
and continuation notes are also excluded, while the main text, sidebars, emails, figure captions, tables (regardless of 
orientation), and end notes are all retained. 
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Character processing 
Earlier, carriage return characters were mapped to newline characters for compatibility with Unix. At this point, 
additional character processing was performed. Octal characters with codes less than 040 (with the exception of 012 and 
015) or greater than 176 were mapped to spaces (octal code 040) prior to Perilog processing because some characters in 
these ranges have been found to have undesirable consequences in the Unix processing environment.  
Characters with octal codes outside the acceptable range were found in chapter 6 with the frequencies and encoded 
characters shown in the following table. The standard used for character encoding in the PDF file was not available, so 
the encoded characters were determined by inspection of the text and its corresponding numerical codes. 
octal code frequency description and mapping
 216 6 the letter "e" with accent grave (better mapped to unaccented "e") 
 245 358 both a true curled apostrophe and a bullet 
 247 1 a stray beta character in an email message header 
 311  43 ellipsis (...) 
 320  65 a long dash 
 322  243 starting curled double quotes 
 323  261 ending curled double quotes 
 324  24 starting straight single quote 
 325  46  ending straight single quote 
In addition, all letters were mapped to upper case because the current implementation of the Perilog software works best 
that way. This is a legacy of the software's original application to the ASRS database in which all letters are capitalized. 
Editing text to create units of text based on paragraphs 
The text resulting from the previous processes can be processed as a single document by Perilog, but for present 
purposes the approach taken was to treat individual paragraphs as units of text so that they could be retrieved and 
relevance-ranked individually. (There are other ways to break up long documents into units of text, such as treating 
sentences or passages as sub-documents.) The text was edited to ensure that paragraphs could be easily recognized by 
the software as individual units of text. To mark paragraphs, the text was edited to ensure that a single empty line 
followed each paragraph. In addition, the text (especially email) was edited to remove any blank lines that would mark 
an undesired paragraph break. 
While ordinary paragraphs were treated as units of text, various other text configurations were also treated as units of 
text. 
• Quoted sub-paragraphs that illustrate points made in preceding text were combined with the text that introduces 
them. For example, the numbered subparagraphs shown below were combined with the paragraph that precedes 
them to form a single unit of text. 
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 • Each section header was included with the first paragraph of its section to form a single unit of text. Since headers 
become in-line text, a dash (-) was added after each header in order to distinguish it. For example (from page 
145): 
MISSED OPPORTUNITY 1 - On Sunday, Rodney Rocha e-mailed a Johnson Space Center 
Engineering Directorate manager to ask if a Mission Action Request was in 
progress for Columbia's crew to visually inspect the left wing for damage. 
Rocha never received an answer. 
• In transcripts, a unit of text was defined as continuous speech by a single speaker. Further, if a section header 
preceded a speaker's quote, the header and quote were combined as a single unit of text, with a dash added after 
the header. For example (from page 147): 
Transcript Excerpts from the January 21, Mission Management Team Meeting - 
Ham:" Alright, I know you guys are looking at the debris." 
• Email messages were treated as units of text. Text introducing an email message, such as the following from page 
150: 
An e-mail that Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Lee sent to Don McCormack the 
following day shows that the Defense Department had begun to implement Austin's 
request. 
 was combined with the message it introduces to create a single unit of text.  
• Figure captions were treated as units of text. 
• Sidebars were handled on a case-by-case basis. Some paragraph boundaries were ignored, as when the whole 
sidebar on page 124 was treated as a single unit of text. In contrast, each definition in the sidebar on page 122 
was treated as a separate unit of text. Paragraphs in the long sidebar "The Crater Model" were retained, and 
each was treated as a unit of text. 
• Each end note was treated as a unit of text, except those consisting of "Ibid., which were grouped with the full 
reference. 
Labeling units of text 
Once the editing processes of the preceding section were complete, the paragraphs and paragraph-like units of text were 
labeled. Each one was automatically preceded by a header line, which is required by Perilog. For example, 
NONWORD v01_ch06_pg000_item0002 
This chapter connects Chapter 5's analysis of NASA's  
broader policy environment to a focused scrutiny of Space  
Shuttle Program decisions that led to the STS-107 accident.  
Section 6.1 illustrates how foam debris losses that violated  
design requirements came to be defined by NASA management... 
 
A Perilog header line starts with the string "NONWORD" and after a space or tab has an identifier that is unique for each 
unit of text. The identifier can be as simple as a number, or can be more complex and informative like the one shown 
above. Identifiers may include numbers, letters, and underscores. 
 
The identifier above has four parts, separated by an underscore: volume number, chapter number, page number, and item 
number. "v01" refers to volume 1 of the CAIB report. "ch06" refers to chapter 6, "Decision Making at NASA. "pg000" 
refers to the page number, where 000 is a placeholder for the actual page number. "item0002" refers to the second unit of 
text, where the item number starts with 0001 and ends with the total number of units. 
 
The identifier used here is very helpful when relevant text is later retrieved by Perilog. When the relevant text is shown 
with its identifier, or a list of relevant identifiers is provided, the identifiers themselves indicate the location of the text 
item within the CAIB document. While the demonstration database contains only chapter 6 of volume 1, when numerous 
volumes and chapters are included, these identifiers would be even more helpful in locating the original text of each 
item. 
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Since there is no way to automatically and reliably assign page numbers to the headers, each item of text was located in 
the source document and each header was edited to provide the correct page number. For example, in the identifier 
v01_ch06_pg000_item00020 the placeholder 000 was changed to the actual page number, 121, to produce the identifier 
v01_ch06_pg121_item0002. 
 
The resulting file containing all of chapter 6, with each paragraph and paragraph-like unit of text having a header line, 
was now in the proper format for input to Perilog. This format and the subsequent processing steps are described in the 
documentation provided with the Perilog software distributions and are beyond the scope of this appendix.  
Selecting a stoplist 
Most of the Perilog processes depend upon recognition of a class of words that are called "stopwords. These are 
typically rather generic words, including articles such as "a" and "the, nouns such as "something, pronouns such as 
"anybody, verbs such as "are, adverbs such as "generally, and other words that are generic from the point of view of 
the topics of interest. For this reason, stopwords are sometimes called noncontent words. Clearly, words like "foam" and 
"damage" are content words rather than stopwords, but there is no automatic and definitive test that can ensure that 
categorizing a particular word as a stopword is appropriate for a given text.  
Stoplists must be selected carefully, and tuned for compatibility with the full range of topics of interest within the text 
being processed. A stoplist for "general text" (Frakes & Baeza-Yates 1992: 114-5) was initially applied to the CAIB text. 
When reviewing extracted phrases, some of them seemed odd. To diagnose the problem, phrase search was used to find 
instances of the odd phrases. For example, the extracted phrases "mission evaluation" and "intercenter photo" seemed 
truncated. Reviewing the results of the phrase search showed that "mission evaluation" always occurs in the phrase 
"mission evaluation room, and "intercenter photo" always appears in "intercenter photo working group".  
Reviewing the initially applied stoplist provided the explanation. The words "room, "working, and "group" were 
among the words in the stoplist, so those words were restricted within phrases. After customizing the stoplist to remove 
words such as "room, "working, "group, and others that seemed potentially problematic, much better results were 
obtained. This illustrates the importance of matching a stoplist to the full range of topics of interest within a text. Shown 
below are the words contained in the stoplist that was ultimately applied to the CAIB text.
A 
ALREADY 
ALSO 
ALTHOUGH 
AN 
AND 
ANOTHER 
ANY 
ANYBODY 
ANYONE 
ANYTHING 
ANYWHERE 
ARE 
AS 
AT 
B 
BE 
BEEN 
BEINGS 
BOTH 
BY 
C 
D 
DID 
DO 
DOES 
DONE 
DOWNED 
DOWNING 
DOWNS 
E 
EACH 
EITHER 
EVEN 
EVENLY 
EVER 
EVERY 
EVERYBODY 
EVERYONE 
EVERYTHING 
EVERYWHERE 
F 
FOR 
FROM 
FURTHERED 
FURTHERING 
FURTHERS 
G 
GENERALLY 
H 
HAD 
HAS 
HAVE 
HAVING 
HE 
HER 
HERSELF 
HIM 
HIMSELF 
HIS 
HOWEVER 
I 
IN 
IS 
IT 
ITS 
ITSELF 
J 
JUST 
K 
L 
LARGELY 
LET 
LETS 
LIKELY 
M 
ME 
MOSTLY 
MR 
MRS 
MUCH 
MY 
MYSELF 
N 
O 
OF 
ON 
ONLY 
OR 
OTHER 
OTHERS 
OUR 
P 
Q 
QUITE 
R 
RATHER 
REALLY 
S 
SHALL 
SHE 
SINCE 
SO 
SOME 
SOMEBODY 
SOMEONE 
SOMETHING 
SOMEWHERE 
STILL 
SUCH 
T 
THAN 
THAT 
THE 
THEIR 
THEM 
THESE 
THEY 
THIS 
THOSE 
18 
THOUGH WAS WHILE YOUR 
TO WE WHOSE YOURS 
Z TOO WELL WILL 
 U WELLS WITH 
US WENT X  
V WERE Y 
VERY WHETHER YET 
W WHICH YOU 
 
Perilog methods, as documented in the patents (McGreevy 2004a-d), also include provision for numerous special 
purpose stoplists based on the primary application-specific stoplist, such as the one shown above. These stoplists provide 
fine-tuning for processing special phrases such as "in-flight anomaly" or "take off, which begin or end with words that 
in most other contexts are still to be treated as stopwords. The current software does not fully implement these methods. 
As a consequence, Perilog software is now delivered with several stoplists, including a safety-related stoplist that does 
not include prepositions such as "in" and "off, and a nonsafety-related stoplist that includes prepositions. 
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Appendix 2. Examples of passages about 
beliefs.  
Highlighting was added (manually) for readability. The 
order of the passages shown here is determined by the 
relevance of the source paragraphs to the words "belief", 
"beliefs", "believe", and "believed" in context. The 
passages are from CAIB Report Volume 1, chapter 6, 
"Decision Making at NASA.” Source page numbers in 
CAIB Report Volume 1 are shown in parentheses. 
ENGINEERS WHO ATTENDED THIS BRIEFING 
INDICATED A BELIEF THAT MANAGEMENT FOCUSED 
ON THE ANSWER - THAT ANALYSIS PROVED THERE 
WAS NO SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUE - RATHER THAN 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE LARGE UNCERTAINTIES THAT 
MAY HAVE UNDERMINED THE ANALYSIS THAT 
PROVIDED THAT ANSWER .  (160) 
AFTER REVIEWING AVAILABLE FILM , INTERCENTER 
PHOTO WORKING GROUP ENGINEERS BELIEVED THE 
ORBITER MAY HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY THE STRIKE 
.  ... IT WAS AT THIS POINT , BEFORE ANY ANALYSIS 
HAD STARTED , THAT SHUTTLE PROGRAM 
MANAGERS OFFICIALLY SHARED THEIR BELIEF 
THAT THE STRIKE POSED NO SAFETY ISSUES , AND 
THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A REVIEW TO BE 
CONDUCTED OVER THE WEEKEND .  (142) 
PROGRAM MANAGERS , FROM RON DITTEMORE TO 
INDIVIDUAL MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM 
MEMBERS , HAD , OVER THE COURSE OF THE SPACE 
SHUTTLE PROGRAM , GRADUALLY BECOME INURED 
TO EXTERNAL TANK FOAM LOSSES AND ON A 
FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL DID NOT BELIEVE FOAM 
STRIKING THE VEHICLE POSED A CRITICAL THREAT 
TO THE ORBITER . IN PARTICULAR , SHUTTLE 
MANAGERS EXHIBITED A BELIEF THAT RCC PANELS 
ARE IMPERVIOUS TO FOAM IMPACTS .  (168) 
DEBRIS ASSESSMENT TEAM MEMBERS BELIEVED 
THAT IMAGING OF POTENTIALLY DAMAGED AREAS 
WAS NECESSARY EVEN AFTER THE JANUARY 24 , 
MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM MEETING , WHERE 
THEY HAD REPORTED THEIR RESULTS .  (168) 
SECTION 6.3 NOTES THE DECISIONS MADE DURING 
STS-107 IN RESPONSE TO THE BIPOD FOAM STRIKE , 
AND REVEALS HOW ENGINEERS ' CONCERNS ABOUT 
RISK AND SAFETY WERE COMPETING WITH - AND 
WERE DEFEATED BY - MANAGEMENT 'S BELIEF THAT 
FOAM COULD NOT HURT THE ORBITER , AS WELL AS 
THE NEED TO KEEP ON SCHEDULE .  (121) 
CALVIN SCHOMBURG STATED A BELIEF THAT IF 
THERE WAS SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE TILES , " 
NOTHING COULD BE DONE . "  (160) 
AT THIS POINT , TILE EXPERT CALVIN SCHOMBURG 
STATES HIS BELIEF THAT NO SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT 
ISSUE EXISTS .  (162) 
THE BOEING ANALYSTS NEXT ASKED WHY THEY 
WERE WORKING SO HARD ANALYZING POTENTIAL 
DAMAGE AREAS IF SHUTTLE PROGRAM 
MANAGEMENT BELIEVED THE DAMAGE WAS MINOR 
AND THAT NO SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUES EXISTED .  
(160) 
SCHOMBURG , THOUGH AWARE OF THE DEBRIS 
ASSESSMENT TEAM 'S REQUEST FOR IMAGING , TOLD 
SHACK AND PETETE THAT HE BELIEVED ON - ORBIT 
IMAGING OF POTENTIALLY DAMAGED AREAS WAS 
NOT NECESSARY .  (156) 
THE DEBRIS ASSESSMENT TEAM FOCUSED ON 
ANALYZING THE IMPACT AT LOCATIONS OTHER 
THAN THE RCC LEADING EDGE . THIS MAY HAVE 
BEEN DUE , AT LEAST IN PART , TO THE TRANSPORT 
ANALYSIS PRESENTATION AND THE LONG - 
STANDING BELIEF THAT FOAM WAS NOT A THREAT 
TO RCC PANELS .  (145) 
A TILE EXPERT TOLD MANAGERS DURING FREQUENT 
CONSULTATIONS THAT STRIKE DAMAGE WAS ONLY 
A MAINTENANCE - LEVEL CONCERN AND THAT ON - 
ORBIT IMAGING OF POTENTIAL WING DAMAGE WAS 
NOT NECESSARY . MISSION MANAGEMENT 
WELCOMED THIS OPINION AND SOUGHT NO OTHERS . 
THIS CONSTANT REINFORCEMENT OF MANAGERS ' 
PRE - EXISTING BELIEFS ADDED ANOTHER BLOCK TO 
THE WALL BETWEEN DECISION MAKERS AND 
CONCERNED ENGINEERS .  (169) 
SHUTTLE PROGRAM MANAGERS ENTERED THE 
MISSION WITH THE BELIEF , RECENTLY REINFORCED 
BY THE STS-113 FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW , THAT A 
FOAM STRIKE IS NOT A SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUE .   
(171) 
CONTE ASKED ROCHA IF HE WANTED HER TO PURSUE 
SUCH A REQUEST THROUGH MISSIONS OPERATIONS 
DIRECTORATE CHANNELS . ROCHA SAID NO , 
BECAUSE HE BELIEVED PROGRAM MANAGERS 
WOULD STILL HAVE TO SUPPORT SUCH A REQUEST . 
SINCE THEY HAD ALREADY DECIDED THAT IMAGING 
OF POTENTIALLY DAMAGED AREAS WAS NOT 
NECESSARY , ROCHA THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT 
THE DEBRIS ASSESSMENT TEAM COULD CONVINCE 
THEM OTHERWISE WITHOUT DEFINITIVE DATA .  (158) 
NO TESTS WERE PERFORMED WITH LARGER DEBRIS 
OBJECTS BECAUSE IT WAS NOT BELIEVED SUCH 
DEBRIS COULD EVER IMPACT THE ORBITER . THIS 
RESULTED IN A VERY LIMITED SET OF CONDITIONS 
UNDER WHICH CRATER 'S RESULTS WERE 
EMPIRICALLY VALIDATED .  (144) 
AS IT BECAME CLEAR DURING THE MISSION THAT 
MANAGERS WERE NOT AS CONCERNED AS OTHERS 
ABOUT THE DANGER OF THE FOAM STRIKE , THE 
ABILITY OF ENGINEERS TO CHALLENGE THOSE 
BELIEFS GREATLY DIMINISHED .  (169) 
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Appendix 3. Excerpts containing the word 
"if", sorted on source paragraphs. 
The excerpts are from CAIB Report Volume 1, chapter 6, 
"Decision Making at NASA.” These excerpts are from the 
40  paragraphs that are most relevant to the word "if". The 
order of the excerpts shown here is determined by the 
relevance of the 40 paragraphs to the word "if" in context, 
which is determined by a Perilog keyword-in-context 
search on the word "if". Source page numbers in CAIB 
Report Volume 1 are shown in parentheses. Also see 
appendix 4, in which the excerpts are sorted differently. 
IF IT HIT THE RCC ... IF WE DON'T SEE A SAFETY - OF - 
FLIGHT ISSUE (161) 
IF SOMETHING WERE TO GO TERRIBLY WRONG ... IF 
SHUTTLE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BELIEVED THE 
DAMAGE WAS MINOR AND THAT NO SAFETY - OF - 
FLIGHT ISSUES EXISTED (160) 
IF HE HAD ADDITIONAL FOOTAGE OF EXTERNAL 
TANK SEPARATION ... IF HE HAD MORE EXTERNAL 
TANK SEPARATION FILM (148) 
" WHAT - IF " LANDING SCENARIOS OF THE 
POTENTIAL OUTCOME IF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR 
DOOR SUSTAINED DAMAGED [sic] (169) 
IF LAUNCH PROCESSING AND COUNTDOWN 
PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY ... IF MORE THOROUGH 
REPAIRS COULD BE DEVELOPED (173) 
IF THERE WERE OPTIONS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF 
THE STS-107 CREW ... IF THE WING STRUCTURE WAS 
PREDICTED TO FAIL ON LANDING (173) 
IF FOAM SHEDDING COULD NOT BE PREVENTED 
ENTIRELY ... IF BURN - THROUGH OCCURS (129) 
IF PROGRAM MANAGERS HAD UNDERSTOOD THE 
THREAT THAT THE BIPOD FOAM STRIKE POSED AND 
WERE ABLE TO UNEQUIVOCALLY DETERMINE 
BEFORE FLIGHT DAY SEVEN THAT THERE WAS 
POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO THE LEFT 
WING (174) 
IF THERE IS A QUESTION ABOUT MAIN GEAR WELL 
BURN THRU ... IF YOU COME IN FAST AND AT 
SLIGHTLY LESS PITCH ATTITUDE (164) 
IF SHACK 'S BOSS , JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
ENGINEERING DIRECTOR FRANK BENZ , KNEW 
ABOUT THE REQUEST ... IF IT 'S NOT SAFE (157) 
IF THE MISSION 'S ORBITER , ATLANTIS , SHOULD BE 
ROLLED FROM THE ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY 
TO THE VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING , PER ITS PRE - 
LAUNCH SCHEDULE (139) 
IF THE ORBITER LANDED AT KENNEDY ... IF BAD 
WEATHER AT KENNEDY FORCED THOSE TWO 
FLIGHTS TO LAND AT EDWARDS (136) 
IF HE KNEW WHO WAS REQUESTING THE IMAGERY 
(153) 
IF ANYBODY IS TALKING ABOUT EXTENSION DAYS 
OR GOING TO GO WITH THAT ... IF THEY GET ANY 
QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCES OR THAT 
SORT OF THING (161) 
IF MONITORING WAS IMPROVED (127) 
IF A MISSION ACTION REQUEST WAS IN PROGRESS 
FOR COLUMBIA'S CREW TO VISUALLY INSPECT THE 
LEFT WING FOR DAMAGE (145) 
IF WE HAVE A GROUND OR SATELLITE ASSET THAT 
CAN TAKE A HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTO OF THE 
SHUTTLE WHILE ON - ORBIT - - TO SEE IF THERE IS 
ANY FOD DAMAGE ON THE WING (150) 
IF ENGELAUF COULD HAVE THE FLIGHT DYNAMICS 
OFFICER AT JOHNSON SPACE CENTER MAKE AN 
OFFICIAL REQUEST TO THE CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN 
OPERATIONS CENTER (152) 
IF AVAILABLE MONDAY MORNING ... IF ULF2 LAUNCH 
WERE 10 / 7 / 04 (135) 
IF OTHER ASSUMPTIONS WERE USED (168) 
IF HE WANTED HER TO PURSUE SUCH A REQUEST 
THROUGH MISSIONS OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 
CHANNELS (158) 
IF A DRYDEN LANDING WAS NOT REQUIRED (137) 
IF THERE WAS SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE TILES (160) 
IF THE ORBITER HAD BEEN DAMAGED (145) 
IF THEY ALL AGREED WITH THE COMPLETED 
ANALYSES AND WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT NO 
SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUES EXISTED (163) 
IF THE CRATER RESULTS WERE PROPERLY 
INTERPRETED (171) 
IF IT WAS ACCEPTABLE (122) 
IF ANY SR&QA PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED IN THE 
DECISION TO SAY THAT THE ASCENT DEBRIS HIT  
( LEFT WING ) IS SAFE (166) 
IF THE REQUEST WAS THEIRS (153) 
IF A SHUTTLE FLIGHT HAD TO SLIP (134) 
IF I SPENT MORE TIME THINKING ABOUT IT (155) 
IF PROGRAM MANAGERS WERE ABLE TO 
UNEQUIVOCALLY DETERMINE BEFORE FLIGHT DAY 
SEVEN THAT THERE WAS POTENTIALLY 
CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO THE LEFT WING (174) 
IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTED A SLIP OF THAT 
DATE (133) 
IF MANAGERS AND ENGINEERS WERE TO ARGUE 
THAT FOAM STRIKES ARE A SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT 
ISSUE (150) 
IF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM 'S RATIONALE TO FLY 
WITH FOAM LOSS WAS FOUND TO BE FLAWED (148) 
IF THEY HAD ANY INTEREST / DESIRE IN REQUESTING 
RESOURCES OUTSIDE OF NASA TO VIEW THE 
ORBITER (158) 
IF COLUMBIA HAD SUSTAINED DAMAGE (147) 
IF THIS GOAL WAS NOT MET (131) 
IF A REASONABLE LAUNCH SCHEDULE IS TO BE 
MAINTAINED (130) 
IF HE HAD A " REQUIREMENT " FOR IMAGERY OF 
COLUMBIA 'S LEFT WING (153) 
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Appendix 4. Excerpts containing the word 
"if", sorted on excerpts. 
The excerpts are from CAIB Report Volume 1, chapter 6, 
"Decision Making at NASA.” These excerpts are from the 
40 paragraphs that are most relevant to the word "if", 
which is determined by a Perilog keyword-in-context 
search on the word "if".  The order of the excerpts shown 
here is determined by excerpt relevance to all of the 
concerns expressed in chapter 6, which is determined by 
using Perilog software tools to rank the excerpts according 
to their relevance to a model of the whole chapter. Source 
page numbers in CAIB Report Volume 1 are shown in 
parentheses. Also see appendix 3, in which the excerpts 
are sorted differently. 
IF HE HAD ADDITIONAL FOOTAGE OF EXTERNAL 
TANK SEPARATION ... IF HE HAD MORE EXTERNAL 
TANK SEPARATION FILM (148) 
IF THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM'S RATIONALE TO FLY 
WITH FOAM LOSS WAS FOUND TO BE FLAWED (148) 
IF PROGRAM MANAGERS HAD UNDERSTOOD THE 
THREAT THAT THE BIPOD FOAM STRIKE POSED AND 
WERE ABLE TO UNEQUIVOCALLY DETERMINE 
BEFORE FLIGHT DAY SEVEN THAT THERE WAS 
POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO THE LEFT 
WING (174) 
IF PROGRAM MANAGERS WERE ABLE TO 
UNEQUIVOCALLY DETERMINE BEFORE FLIGHT DAY 
SEVEN THAT THERE WAS POTENTIALLY 
CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE TO THE LEFT WING (174) 
IF FOAM SHEDDING COULD NOT BE PREVENTED 
ENTIRELY ... IF BURN - THROUGH OCCURS (129) 
IF MANAGERS AND ENGINEERS WERE TO ARGUE 
THAT FOAM STRIKES ARE A SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT 
ISSUE (150) 
IF SOMETHING WERE TO GO TERRIBLY WRONG ... IF 
SHUTTLE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BELIEVED THE 
DAMAGE WAS MINOR AND THAT NO SAFETY - OF - 
FLIGHT ISSUES EXISTED (160) 
IF ENGELAUF COULD HAVE THE FLIGHT DYNAMICS 
OFFICER AT JOHNSON SPACE CENTER MAKE AN 
OFFICIAL REQUEST TO THE CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN 
OPERATIONS CENTER (152) 
IF SHACK 'S BOSS , JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
ENGINEERING DIRECTOR FRANK BENZ , KNEW 
ABOUT THE REQUEST ... IF IT 'S NOT SAFE (157) 
IF IT HIT THE RCC ... IF WE DON'T SEE A SAFETY - OF - 
FLIGHT ISSUE (161) 
IF A SHUTTLE FLIGHT HAD TO SLIP (134) 
IF A MISSION ACTION REQUEST WAS IN PROGRESS 
FOR COLUMBIA 'S CREW TO VISUALLY INSPECT THE 
LEFT WING FOR DAMAGE (145) 
" WHAT - IF " LANDING SCENARIOS OF THE 
POTENTIAL OUTCOME IF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR 
DOOR SUSTAINED DAMAGED [sic] (169) 
IF THEY ALL AGREED WITH THE COMPLETED 
ANALYSES AND WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT NO 
SAFETY - OF - FLIGHT ISSUES EXISTED (163) 
IF THERE WAS SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE TILES (160) 
IF HE HAD A " REQUIREMENT " FOR IMAGERY OF 
COLUMBIA'S LEFT WING (153) 
IF HE WANTED HER TO PURSUE SUCH A REQUEST 
THROUGH MISSIONS OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 
CHANNELS (158) 
IF ANY SR&QA PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED IN THE 
DECISION TO SAY THAT THE ASCENT DEBRIS HIT  
( LEFT WING ) IS SAFE (166) 
IF THE MISSION 'S ORBITER , ATLANTIS , SHOULD BE 
ROLLED FROM THE ORBITER PROCESSING FACILITY 
TO THE VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING , PER ITS PRE - 
LAUNCH SCHEDULE (139) 
IF I SPENT MORE TIME THINKING ABOUT IT (155) 
IF LAUNCH PROCESSING AND COUNTDOWN 
PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY ... IF MORE THOROUGH 
REPAIRS COULD BE DEVELOPED (173) 
IF COLUMBIA HAD SUSTAINED DAMAGE (147) 
IF A DRYDEN LANDING WAS NOT REQUIRED (137) 
IF A REASONABLE LAUNCH SCHEDULE IS TO BE 
MAINTAINED (130) 
IF THERE IS A QUESTION ABOUT MAIN GEAR WELL 
BURN THRU ... IF YOU COME IN FAST AND AT 
SLIGHTLY LESS PITCH ATTITUDE (164) 
IF THERE WERE OPTIONS FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF 
THE STS-107 CREW ... IF THE WING STRUCTURE WAS 
PREDICTED TO FAIL ON LANDING (173) 
IF WE HAVE A GROUND OR SATELLITE ASSET THAT 
CAN TAKE A HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTO OF THE 
SHUTTLE WHILE ON - ORBIT - - TO SEE IF THERE IS 
ANY FOD DAMAGE ON THE WING (150) 
IF THE CRATER RESULTS WERE PROPERLY 
INTERPRETED (171) 
IF THE ORBITER LANDED AT KENNEDY ... IF BAD 
WEATHER AT KENNEDY FORCED THOSE TWO 
FLIGHTS TO LAND AT EDWARDS (136) 
IF THE ORBITER HAD BEEN DAMAGED (145) 
IF THEY HAD ANY INTEREST / DESIRE IN REQUESTING 
RESOURCES OUTSIDE OF NASA TO VIEW THE 
ORBITER (158) 
IF HE KNEW WHO WAS REQUESTING THE IMAGERY 
(153) 
IF THIS GOAL WAS NOT MET (131) 
IF THE REQUEST WAS THEIRS (153) 
IF AVAILABLE MONDAY MORNING ... IF ULF2 LAUNCH 
WERE 10 / 7 / 04 (135) 
IF ANYBODY IS TALKING ABOUT EXTENSION DAYS 
OR GOING TO GO WITH THAT ... IF THEY GET ANY 
QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCES OR THAT 
SORT OF THING (161) 
IF OTHER ASSUMPTIONS WERE USED (168) 
IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTED A SLIP OF THAT 
DATE (133) 
IF IT WAS ACCEPTABLE (122) 
IF MONITORING WAS IMPROVED (127) 
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